Judicial immunity does not exist for judges who engage in criminal activity, for judges who connive with, aid and abet the criminal activity of another judge, or to a judge for damages sustained by a person who has been harmed by the judge’s connivance with, aiding and abeting, another judge’s criminal activity.
Judicial Responsibility
If a judge does not fully comply with the Constitution, then his orders are void, In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888), he/she is without jurisdiction, and he/she has engaged in
an act or acts of treason.
Any judge who does not comply with his oath to the Constitution of the United States wars against that Constitution and engages in acts in violation of the Supreme Law of the Land. The judge is engaged in acts of treason.
Any judge or attorney who does not report judges for treason as required by law may themselves be guilty of misprision of treason, 18 U.S.C. Section 2382
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) stated that “when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he “comes into conflict with the superior authority at Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.”
TRESPASSERS OF THE LAW
Under Federal law, which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that if a court is “without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers.” Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HAS STATED THAT “NO STATE LEGISLATOR OR EXECUTIVE OR JUDICIAL OFFICER CAN WAR AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION WITHOUT VIOLATING HIS UNDERTAKING TO SUPPORT IT.”. COOPER V. AARON, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.CT. 1401 (1958).
WHENEVER A JUDGE ACTS WHERE HE/SHE DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ACT, THE JUDGE IS ENGAGED IN AN ACT OR ACTS OF TREASON. U.S. V. WILL, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.CT. 471, 66 L.ED.2D 392, 406 (1980); COHENS V. VIRGINIA, 19 U.S. (6 WHEAT) 264, 404, 5 L.ED 257 (1821)
ANY JUDGE OR ATTORNEY WHO DOES NOT REPORT THE JUDGES FOR TREASON AS REQUIRED BY LAW MAY THEMSELVES BE GUILTY OF MISPRISION OF TREASON, 18 U.S.C. SECTION 2382. (Punishable by up to seven years in prison!)
Chapter 13.00
FALSE STATEMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Table of Instructions
Introduction
Instruction
13.01 Concealing a Material Fact in a Matter within the Jurisdiction of the United States Government (18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1))
13.02 Making a False Statement in a Matter within the Jurisdiction of the United States Government (18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2))
13.03 Making or Using a False Writing in a Matter within the Jurisdiction of the United States Government (18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(3))
Introduction to False Statements Instructions
(current through December 31, 2008)
Title 18 U.S.C. § 1001 provides:
§ 1001. Statements or entries generally
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully–
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years or, if the offense involves international or domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331), imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both.
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party’s counsel, for statements, representations, writings or documents submitted by such party or counsel to a judge or magistrate in that proceeding.
(c) With respect to any matter within the jurisdiction of the legislative branch, subsection (a) shall apply only to–
(1) administrative matters, including a claim for payment, a matter related to the procurement of property or services, personnel or employment practices, or support services, or a document required by law, rule, or regulation to be submitted to the Congress or any office or officer within the legislative branch; or
(2) any investigation or review, conducted pursuant to the authority of any committee, subcommittee, commission or office of the Congress, consistent with applicable rules of the House or Senate.
The pattern instructions cover the three subsections of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) with three elements instructions:
13.01 Concealing a Material Fact in a Matter within the Jurisdiction of the United States Government (18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1))
13.02 Making a False Statement in a Matter within the Jurisdiction of the United States Government (18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2))
13.03 Making or Using a False Writing in a Matter within the Jurisdiction of the United States Government (18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(3))
The Committee defined the crime in three instructions because it is the most effective way to describe the three subsections, (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3). The Sixth Circuit has made clear that these subsections are stated in the disjunctive and constitute alternative means of committing a single crime. United States v. Hixon, 987 F.2d 1261, 1265 (6th Cir. 1993) (construing pre-1996 version of statute, but disjunctive language was carried forward in 1996 revision); United States v. Zalman, 870 F.2d 1047, 1054 (6th Cir. 1989) (same).
13.01 CONCEALING A MATERIAL FACT IN A MATTER WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1))
(1) The defendant is charged with the offense of [falsifying] [concealing] [covering up] a material fact in a matter within the jurisdiction of the United States government. For you to find the defendant guilty of this offense, you must find that the government has proved each and every one of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
(A) First, that the defendant [falsified] [concealed] [covered up] a fact that he had a duty to disclose;
(B) Second, that the fact was material;
(C) Third, that the defendant [falsified] [concealed] [covered up] the fact by using a trick, scheme, or device;
(D) Fourth, that the defendant acted knowingly and willfully; and
(E) Fifth, that the fact pertained to a matter within the jurisdiction of the [executive] [legislative] [judicial] branch of the United States government.
(2) Now I will give you more detailed instructions on some of these terms.
(A) A “material” fact or matter is one that has the natural tendency to influence or is capable of influencing a decision of [insert name of government entity].
(B) The term “using a trick, scheme, or device” means acting in a way intended to deceive others.
(C) An act is done “knowingly and willfully” if it is done voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or some other innocent reason.
(D) A matter is “within the jurisdiction of the [executive] [legislative] [judicial] branch of the United States government” if [insert name of government entity] has the power to exercise authority in that matter.
(3) [It is not necessary that the government prove [that the defendant knew the matter was within the jurisdiction of the United States government] [that the statements were made directly to, or even received by, the United States government]].
(4) If you are convinced that the government has proved all of the elements, say so by returning a guilty verdict on this charge. If you have a reasonable doubt about any one of the elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of this charge.
Use Note
The court may need to modify the language if the charge is based on aiding and abetting or causing under 18 U.S.C. § 2.
Brackets indicate options for the court.
The provisions of paragraph (3) should be used only if relevant.
Committee Commentary Instruction 13.01
(current through December 31, 2008)
This instruction covers violations of § 1001 listed in subsection (a)(1) which prohibits falsifying, concealing or covering up a material fact.
Paragraph (1), which sets out the five elements for violating § 1001 by concealment, is based on United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 470 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Steele, 933 F.2d 1313, 1318-19 (6th Cir. 1991) (en banc)). For the legal duty element of concealment, the Committee relied on United States v. Gibson, 409 F.3d 325, 332 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Zalman, 870 F.2d 1047, 1055 (6th Cir. 1989) and United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 566-67 (3d Cir. 1994)). In paragraph (1)(E), the term “pertained to” is from Steele, supra at 1319, and the phrase “a matter within the jurisdiction of the [executive] [legislative] [judicial] branch of” the United States government is based on the language of § 1001(a).
The definition of “material” in paragraph (2)(A) is based on United States v. White, 270 F.3d 356, 365 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Lutz, 154 F.3d 581, 588 (6th Cir. 1998)). The use of brackets for the name of the government entity is based on Tenth Circuit Pattern Instruction 2.46.
For the phrase “using a trick, scheme, or device” in paragraph (2)(B), neither the Supreme Court nor the Sixth Circuit has stated a definition. In the absence of specific authority, the definition in paragraph (2)(B) is based on Tenth Circuit Instruction 2.46.
As to the definition of “knowingly and willfully” in paragraph (2)(C), no Supreme Court or Sixth Circuit cases define either of these terms in the context of § 1001. In the absence of specific authority, the Committee relied on the definition of knowingly given in United States v. McGuire, 744 F.2d 1197, 1201 (6th Cir. 1984) (prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1005 for making a false entry in a bank report). Beyond the general definition of knowingly, case law on § 1001 does establish particular elements to which the term “knowingly” applies. The government must prove that the defendant knew the statement was false. United States v. Brown, 151 F.3d 476, 484 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Arnous, 122 F.3d 321, 322-23 (6th Cir. 1997). The government need not prove that the defendant made the statement with knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction. United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63 (1984).
For the term “willfully” in paragraph (2)(C), aside from the discussion of knowledge of federal jurisdiction in Yermian, supra, neither the Supreme Court nor the Sixth Circuit has defined the term in the context of § 1001. In the absence of such authority, the Committee adopted the approach taken in a plurality of the circuit courts of appeals. Other circuits have concluded that “willfully” in § 1001 does not require the defendant to have specific knowledge that his conduct is criminal. See United States v. Hsia, 176 F.3d 517, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1999); United States v. Daughtry, 48 F.3d 829, 831-32 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 516 U.S. 984 (1995); United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 567-70 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040, 1048 n.21 (5th Cir. 1994). But cf. United States v. Whab, 355 F.3d 155, 159, 162 (2d Cir. 2004)
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Judicial immunity does not exist for judges who engage in criminal activity, for judges who connive with, aid and abet the criminal activity of another judge, or to a judge for damages sustained by a person who has been harmed by the judge’s connivance with, aiding and abeting, another judge’s criminal activity.
Judicial Responsibility
If a judge does not fully comply with the Constitution, then his orders are void, In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888), he/she is without jurisdiction, and he/she has engaged in
an act or acts of treason.
Any judge who does not comply with his oath to the Constitution of the United States wars against that Constitution and engages in acts in violation of the Supreme Law of the Land. The judge is engaged in acts of treason.
Any judge or attorney who does not report judges for treason as required by law may themselves be guilty of misprision of treason, 18 U.S.C. Section 2382
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) stated that “when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he “comes into conflict with the superior authority at Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.”
TRESPASSERS OF THE LAW
Under Federal law, which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that if a court is “without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers.” Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HAS STATED THAT “NO STATE LEGISLATOR OR EXECUTIVE OR JUDICIAL OFFICER CAN WAR AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION WITHOUT VIOLATING HIS UNDERTAKING TO SUPPORT IT.”. COOPER V. AARON, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.CT. 1401 (1958).
WHENEVER A JUDGE ACTS WHERE HE/SHE DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ACT, THE JUDGE IS ENGAGED IN AN ACT OR ACTS OF TREASON. U.S. V. WILL, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.CT. 471, 66 L.ED.2D 392, 406 (1980); COHENS V. VIRGINIA, 19 U.S. (6 WHEAT) 264, 404, 5 L.ED 257 (1821)
ANY JUDGE OR ATTORNEY WHO DOES NOT REPORT THE JUDGES FOR TREASON AS REQUIRED BY LAW MAY THEMSELVES BE GUILTY OF MISPRISION OF TREASON, 18 U.S.C. SECTION 2382. (Punishable by up to seven years in prison!)
Chapter 13.00
FALSE STATEMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Table of Instructions
Introduction
Instruction
13.01 Concealing a Material Fact in a Matter within the Jurisdiction of the United States Government (18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1))
13.02 Making a False Statement in a Matter within the Jurisdiction of the United States Government (18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2))
13.03 Making or Using a False Writing in a Matter within the Jurisdiction of the United States Government (18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(3))
Introduction to False Statements Instructions
(current through December 31, 2008)
Title 18 U.S.C. § 1001 provides:
§ 1001. Statements or entries generally
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully–
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years or, if the offense involves international or domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331), imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both.
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party’s counsel, for statements, representations, writings or documents submitted by such party or counsel to a judge or magistrate in that proceeding.
(c) With respect to any matter within the jurisdiction of the legislative branch, subsection (a) shall apply only to–
(1) administrative matters, including a claim for payment, a matter related to the procurement of property or services, personnel or employment practices, or support services, or a document required by law, rule, or regulation to be submitted to the Congress or any office or officer within the legislative branch; or
(2) any investigation or review, conducted pursuant to the authority of any committee, subcommittee, commission or office of the Congress, consistent with applicable rules of the House or Senate.
The pattern instructions cover the three subsections of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) with three elements instructions:
13.01 Concealing a Material Fact in a Matter within the Jurisdiction of the United States Government (18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1))
13.02 Making a False Statement in a Matter within the Jurisdiction of the United States Government (18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2))
13.03 Making or Using a False Writing in a Matter within the Jurisdiction of the United States Government (18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(3))
The Committee defined the crime in three instructions because it is the most effective way to describe the three subsections, (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3). The Sixth Circuit has made clear that these subsections are stated in the disjunctive and constitute alternative means of committing a single crime. United States v. Hixon, 987 F.2d 1261, 1265 (6th Cir. 1993) (construing pre-1996 version of statute, but disjunctive language was carried forward in 1996 revision); United States v. Zalman, 870 F.2d 1047, 1054 (6th Cir. 1989) (same).
13.01 CONCEALING A MATERIAL FACT IN A MATTER WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1))
(1) The defendant is charged with the offense of [falsifying] [concealing] [covering up] a material fact in a matter within the jurisdiction of the United States government. For you to find the defendant guilty of this offense, you must find that the government has proved each and every one of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
(A) First, that the defendant [falsified] [concealed] [covered up] a fact that he had a duty to disclose;
(B) Second, that the fact was material;
(C) Third, that the defendant [falsified] [concealed] [covered up] the fact by using a trick, scheme, or device;
(D) Fourth, that the defendant acted knowingly and willfully; and
(E) Fifth, that the fact pertained to a matter within the jurisdiction of the [executive] [legislative] [judicial] branch of the United States government.
(2) Now I will give you more detailed instructions on some of these terms.
(A) A “material” fact or matter is one that has the natural tendency to influence or is capable of influencing a decision of [insert name of government entity].
(B) The term “using a trick, scheme, or device” means acting in a way intended to deceive others.
(C) An act is done “knowingly and willfully” if it is done voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or some other innocent reason.
(D) A matter is “within the jurisdiction of the [executive] [legislative] [judicial] branch of the United States government” if [insert name of government entity] has the power to exercise authority in that matter.
(3) [It is not necessary that the government prove [that the defendant knew the matter was within the jurisdiction of the United States government] [that the statements were made directly to, or even received by, the United States government]].
(4) If you are convinced that the government has proved all of the elements, say so by returning a guilty verdict on this charge. If you have a reasonable doubt about any one of the elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of this charge.
Use Note
The court may need to modify the language if the charge is based on aiding and abetting or causing under 18 U.S.C. § 2.
Brackets indicate options for the court.
The provisions of paragraph (3) should be used only if relevant.
Committee Commentary Instruction 13.01
(current through December 31, 2008)
This instruction covers violations of § 1001 listed in subsection (a)(1) which prohibits falsifying, concealing or covering up a material fact.
Paragraph (1), which sets out the five elements for violating § 1001 by concealment, is based on United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 470 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Steele, 933 F.2d 1313, 1318-19 (6th Cir. 1991) (en banc)). For the legal duty element of concealment, the Committee relied on United States v. Gibson, 409 F.3d 325, 332 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Zalman, 870 F.2d 1047, 1055 (6th Cir. 1989) and United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 566-67 (3d Cir. 1994)). In paragraph (1)(E), the term “pertained to” is from Steele, supra at 1319, and the phrase “a matter within the jurisdiction of the [executive] [legislative] [judicial] branch of” the United States government is based on the language of § 1001(a).
The definition of “material” in paragraph (2)(A) is based on United States v. White, 270 F.3d 356, 365 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Lutz, 154 F.3d 581, 588 (6th Cir. 1998)). The use of brackets for the name of the government entity is based on Tenth Circuit Pattern Instruction 2.46.
For the phrase “using a trick, scheme, or device” in paragraph (2)(B), neither the Supreme Court nor the Sixth Circuit has stated a definition. In the absence of specific authority, the definition in paragraph (2)(B) is based on Tenth Circuit Instruction 2.46.
As to the definition of “knowingly and willfully” in paragraph (2)(C), no Supreme Court or Sixth Circuit cases define either of these terms in the context of § 1001. In the absence of specific authority, the Committee relied on the definition of knowingly given in United States v. McGuire, 744 F.2d 1197, 1201 (6th Cir. 1984) (prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1005 for making a false entry in a bank report). Beyond the general definition of knowingly, case law on § 1001 does establish particular elements to which the term “knowingly” applies. The government must prove that the defendant knew the statement was false. United States v. Brown, 151 F.3d 476, 484 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Arnous, 122 F.3d 321, 322-23 (6th Cir. 1997). The government need not prove that the defendant made the statement with knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction. United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63 (1984).
For the term “willfully” in paragraph (2)(C), aside from the discussion of knowledge of federal jurisdiction in Yermian, supra, neither the Supreme Court nor the Sixth Circuit has defined the term in the context of § 1001. In the absence of such authority, the Committee adopted the approach taken in a plurality of the circuit courts of appeals. Other circuits have concluded that “willfully” in § 1001 does not require the defendant to have specific knowledge that his conduct is criminal. See United States v. Hsia, 176 F.3d 517, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1999); United States v. Daughtry, 48 F.3d 829, 831-32 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 516 U.S. 984 (1995); United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 567-70 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040, 1048 n.21 (5th Cir. 1994). But cf. United States v. Whab, 355 F.3d 155, 159, 162 (2d Cir. 2004)